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The promising features of Web services also make them vulnerable to new types of security threats. Web service providers 
must assure their clients confidentiality, integrity and availability over a trusted relationship that may be asynchronous and 
that may involve multiple business partners. Despite the continued significance of the traditional approaches to securing 
content, transmission and connection in a Web-based business environment, including Secure Socket Layer, Virtual Private 
Networks, Internet Protocol Security, and so on, they are not able to address the new challenges posed by Web services. This 
paper aims to provide insight into the management of Web services security. It first introduces the key concepts and reviews 
state-of-the-art Web services security standards.  Then, it aligns the Web services security standards with security threats to 
provide guidance for the practical implementation of Web services security.   Finally, it points out some limitations in the 
current practice and highlights the managerial implications.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Web services provide a new channel for conducting business (Hanna, 2003).  There is a momentum for businesses to adopt 
web services as part of business to business transactions and to develop new business models (Chen, 2003). According to a 
survey on senior-level IT executives, engineers and project managers at global 2000 organizations (Netegrity, 2003), 75 
percent of the respondents planned to roll out Web services in the next 12 months using a number of security standards.  It 
was also reported in the same survey that more than 40% plan to use four or more standards with a majority emphasizing 
WS-Security (Khaler, 2002) and Security Assertion Mark-up Language (SAML) (OASIS, 2003). XML Encryption (Reagle, 
2002), XML Signature (W3Ca, 2002), Kerberos, and X.509 were among the other standards that the respondents plan to use.  
However, in the same survey, more than half won’t use Web services outside the corporate firewall until they are sure that 
transactions are protected against cyber-attacks.  It raises serious concerns over the security issues associated with adopting 
Web services. 
Web services extend the current client-server model with the concept of “loose coupling,” which allow services to be 
discoverable, platform independent, and expressible with self-describing interface (W3Cb, 2002).  It provides a means of 
communication and interoperability among different software applications that may run on different platforms.  However, 
these applications bring risks to business providers by potentially exposing internal business processes and confidential data 
to distributed clients.  An example of such an application is stock trading (Long, Yuan and Whinston, 2003).  The business of 
stock trading is highly time-sensitive and dependent upon the information-intensive transactions. Therefore, traders expect to 
have access to trading processes even while traveling (either wirelessly or with fixed-line), international brokers have the 
need to trade simultaneously in multi-nation markets, and currency traders typically diversify their portfolio by trading over 
international exchanges.  Large volumes of information are being exchanged at any time in the stock market. On the one 
hand, most of the information such as account number, personal information, and gain/loss from completed transactions 
should be kept confidential from the third parties. On the other hand, the stock trading business strives to ensure that traders 
are really who they are in conducting the transactions. All these security issues pose challenges to successfully deploying 
Web services. 
The safety of information exchange can be assured by addressing five security requirements: authentication, authorization, 
Non-repudiation, confidentiality and Integrity (Nakamur, Hada and Neyama, 2002).  Client-to-server and server-to-server 
authentication must be seamless.   If a web service provider receives a request for service, it must be able to verify the 
requester’s identity and privileges.  Conversely, the requester who receives any information or service can verify that the 
information is coming from a trusted source. Based on a requester’s authentication, authorization may be granted such that 
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information meant for a particular client can only be accessed specifically by that client.   Because of the multiple hops in a 
web service environment, it is possible that they do not share the same authentication or authorization infrastructure.  SAML, 
which is an XML based infrastructure, may be implemented to handle this challenge.  In non-repudiation, clients should not 
be able to reject transactions that were initiated by them.  Confidentiality ensures that the exchanged information is protected 
against interception.  Integrity provides the assurance that the message was not modified deliberately or accidentally during 
transit.  
Security measures in a Web services environment should be implemented to ensure that data can only be accessed by 
authorized users, or to provide a certain level of assurance on the identity of service processes when a client is about to pass 
sensitive information.  The rest of paper is organized as follows. We first review Web services standards. Then, we evaluate 
security challenges specific to Web services and the Web services security standards. Based on our investigation, we provide 
a guideline for matching security standards to business needs. Finally, we discuss the limitations in the current practice of 
Web service security and suggest future directions. 
WEB SERVICES STANDARDS 
The current web environment is “human-centric” in that a typical user would interact with the merchant web-site which lacks 
integration with the entire supply chain.  Web services offer the capability of integrating the processes and becoming more 
“application-centric”.  The “application-centric” approach will allow various business applications from different service 
providers to share data using XML standards.  Web services typically consist of four main components: Web service 
consumer, Web service provider, business agreement, and registry, as shown in Figure 1.  The Web service consumer or 
client program makes a request to, and gets a response from one or several Web service providers.  The Web service provider 
is a company or organization hosting a program in Web service that can receive requests from and send response to Web 
services consumers.  A business agreement or document defines the functionality of a Web service and how that functionality 
can be accessed by consumers.  The fourth component is a registry where Web service providers publish their services and 
Web consumers search for a web service. 
Web services must be published to the Internet community by the Web service provider in order to make them available to 
potential consumers.  Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is a standard XML based vocabulary used to describe 
Web services, which are then published using the Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) protocol, another 
part of the XML vocabulary.  The purpose of WSDL is to provide a file that a client can use to invoke the Web service and 
its functions.  A WSDL document simply consists of a set of definitions.  The UDDI protocol is one of the major building 
blocks required for successful Web services (UDDI, 2001).   The UDDI enables businesses to quickly, easily, and 
dynamically discover and interact with one another independent of the platform, by using applications that they are familiar 
with.  In addition, the UDDI registry allows virtual business functions to be integrated regardless of the internal processes of 
each business entity as long as they meet the Web services standards.  Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) is a 
lightweight, XML based messaging protocol framework for building and exchanging distributed, structured information in a 
decentralized and distributed environment.  There are three parts in a soap message -an envelope, a set of encoding rules, and 
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Most of the Web services transactions are messaging based.  SOAP has been extensively used as the messaging protocol.  In 
the next section, we will primarily focus on the security issues involved in the SOAP messaging between Web service 
consumers and Web service providers, as highlighted in Figure 1.   
WEB SERVICES SECURITY CHALLENGES 
In a Web services environment, multiple trading partners are accessing applications across disparate corporate firewalls using 
multiple devices and involving multi-step processes (Chang, Chen and Hsu, 2003).  Compared with regular business 
transactions on the Web, Web services pose new challenges to security management, which are selectively listed as follows: 
• A security method should support single sign-on schemes. Without such mechanisms in place, each trading partner 
has to maintain its own authentication and authorization, which may greatly compromise the convenience of Web 
services.  
• A security method needs to consider the security implications of supporting multiple devices (e.g. Personal Digital 
Assistants, 3G cell phones).  For example, wireless standards such as GSM and WAP do not offer end-to-end 
security (Claessens, Preneel, and Vandewalle, 2001). 
• A security method should ensure confidentiality and integrity of the transactions in a multi-step process.   
The above security challenges specific to Web services are not addressed by the current point-to-point content security 
technologies such as SSL, VPNs, and IPSec. Among a number of security implications resulting from Web services, we 
select information integrity and trust management to illustrate the limitations of traditional security standards. 
Information integrity provides the assurance that messages were not modified deliberately or accidentally during transit.  A 
traditional environment may involve only two partners.  SSL supports transport layer security between two SSL-enabled 
parties.  It is based on point-to-point connection sessions, and thus each SSL session is unique.   When the data are not “in 
transit” between the two parties, it is not encrypted and thus not secure.  The data is vulnerable to attack when it is between 
two SSL sessions in a multi-party or multi-step operation.  Therefore, SSL is not sufficient for ensuring integrity in a multi-
party or multi-step Web service transaction.  Another drawback of SSL is that it is designed to encrypt the entire document 
before transmitting it.  However, in a Web services environment, there may be a need to only secure part of a document.  For 
example, a merchant should only be allowed to read information in a message that is pertinent to them.  Other point-to-point 
technologies such as VPN and IPSec suffer from the same inherent weaknesses. 
Web services across enterprises are dealing with un-trusted clients.  Trust management in a multiple-partner transaction must 
be more dynamic in order for distributed networking to scale (Morioka, Yonemoto, Suzuki and Etoh, 2003).  By definition, 
Web services are loosely coupled.  As such, authorization policies are more difficult to implement by individual merchants.  
Nonetheless, there is still a need to identify if a caller is authorized to request for a Web service.   While the commonly used 
trusted third party approach on the Web (Chang et al, 2003) allows end-to-end agreement with security policies, it does not 
manage versioning for a long-duration operation.  It has been recently proposed that Web services themselves may be used to 
provide trust services (Baldwin, Shiu and Mont, 2002) 
In sum, Web services require a finer grained security protocol beyond the traditional security standards.  In the next section, 
we will discuss Web services security standards that are developed to resolve some of the security challenges. 
WEB SERVICES SECURITY STANDARDS 
Web services are situated at the application layer within the network protocol stack.  Therefore, it is important to secure the 
perimeter, network, and host to reduce threats.  Since Web services are XML based, in principle, existing security measures 
should be supplemented with XML security frameworks to ensure that Web services are secured.  We summarize some of the 
existing key XML frameworks for Web services security in Table 1. As Web services still rely on the Internet to operate, the 
non-XML frameworks, which are situated underneath the application layer, can still be used to secure the communication of 
Web services. Thus, we also identified some non-XML frameworks in Table 1.  Next, we elaborate on the key features of 
each of the XML framework based security standards respectively. 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) defines an XML-based protocol by which clients can request assertions from 
SAML authorities and receive responses from them.  SAML assertions can be digitally signed.  The assertions can convey 
information about whether accesses to resources are allowed.  It allows disparate security systems to interoperate with each 
other.  However, SAML assumes trust between the participants and it defers this responsibility to XML Encryption and XML 
Digital Signature.  There are three kinds of SAML assertion statements: authentication, attribute, and authorization decision. 
Electronic Business XML (ebXML) is an initiative between OASIS and the United Nations Center for Trade Facilitation and 
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Electronic Business (UN/CEFACT).  ebXML specifies a framework for the exchange of electronic business data. Extensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is an XML specification for expressing policies for information access over the 
Internet.  It provides a fine-grained access control to XML documents and other documents shared on the internet.  XACML 
differs from SAML in that SAML assertions are formulated at runtime.  Extensible Rights Markup Language (XrML) 
provides a method for specifying and managing the rights and policies associated with digital content and services. Compared 
with XACML, XrML is easier to use but at the cost of expressivity and flexibility. 
 
XML Frameworks Non-XML Frameworks 
High-Level Security Frameworks (SAML, 
XrML, XACML etc.) 
WS-Security 






Socket Layer (TLS/SSL) 
Transport Layer (HTTP, FTP, SMTP, 
etc.) 
Transmission Control Protocol and 
Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
Table 1. Web Services Security Specifications 
 
WS-Security (Khaler, 2002) describes the enhancements that can be used to accommodate the current variety of security 
models and encryption technologies.  The goal is achieved by providing quality of protection of SOAP messaging.  Web 
services have typically relied on traditional security methods such as SSL and firewalls.  However, SOAP messages can 
easily pass through firewalls and therefore requires additional security solutions.  This can be achieved with WS-security. 
The WS-Security specification proposes a set of SOAP extensions that can be used when building secure Web services to 
ensure integrity and confidentiality.  The purpose of WS-Security is to allow SOAP messages to be constructed securely.  It 
also supports a variety of security models including Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), Kerberos, and SSL.  Among others, 
security token propagation, message integrity, and message confidentiality are three mechanisms provided by this 
specification. 
Data can be digitally signed.  An XML Signature is defined within the <Signature> element.  XML Signatures provide 
integrity, message authentication, and/or signer authentication services for data of any type, either located within the XML 
including the signature or elsewhere.   It also provides XML-compliant syntax for representing the signature for Web 
resources and portions of protocol messages and procedures for computing and verifying such signatures.  XML signatures 
provide proof for non-repudiation of who created it (Naedele, 2003).  XML Encryption is a process of encrypting data and 
representing the result with XML.  The main element is <Encrypted Data>.   XML Encryption defines how digital content is 
encrypted and decrypted, how the encryption key is passed to a recipient and how encrypted XML data and non-XML data is 
identified.  The result is an XML encryption element that contains or references the cipher data.   Both XML Encryption and 
XML Signature can be applied in any sequence.  If XML encryption is applied after XML signature, the XML signature will 
not be immediately verifiable.  Such a document needs to be decrypted before the signature can be verified.  The XML 
Signature specification includes information to identify documents that are encrypted either after signing or before signature.  
XML Encryption and XML Signature also provide the ability to encrypt only selected portions of a document.  This is an 
enhancement over SSL which encrypts the entire document before it is transmitted.   
Current corporate firewalls can only filter at the packet level but not at the content level.  They typically work by blocking 
TCP ports except for port 80 (HTTP traffic), port 25 (email traffic), and port 443 (HTTPS traffic).  This raises a serious 
security issue as many Web services are designed to pass through port 80.  XML firewalls are designed to examine XML 
content of the incoming traffic.  XML firewalls may be hardware or software based. XML Key Management Specification 
(XKMS) defines protocols for distributing and registering public keys which may be used in conjunction with XML 
Signature and XML Encryption standards.  It also describes how a client may receive key information from a Web service. 
A Web Services Security Scenario 
In this section, we use a scenario (Figure 2) to illustrate how the Web services security standards can be applied in a typical 
Web services environment.   
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Joe Shopper (either a person or an agent), a Web services consumer, is interested in purchasing some products from 
MyShopping.com. Joe Shopper submits an order of those products on MyShopping.com’s purchasing portal using an HTML 
form.  The portal authenticates the user and creates two SOAP messages, a billing SOAP message to MyBilling.com and a 
shipping SOAP message to MyShipping.com.  MyShopping.com can also be considered as a Web services consumer of the 
services provided by MyShipping.com and MyBilling.com.  The SOAP message to the billing Web service includes a WS-
Security header enclosing Joe Shopper’s name and the password digest.  The SOAP envelope includes the payment 
information encoded with XML Encryption to hide his credit card number.  If the billing is completed successfully, 
MyBilling.com will return a SOAP message to MyShopping.com with the billing status.  Once the billing service is 
completed successfully, the shipping SOAP message is submitted to MyShipping.com.  The SOAP message for the shipping 
Web service includes a WS-Security header enclosing a SAML assertion, which may be signed using XML Signature.  The 
SOAP envelope includes the list of items to be shipped to the consumer.  MyShipping.com returns a SOAP message in 
response to MyShopping.com once the shipping process is completed. 
 
WEB SERVICE CONSUMERSJoe Shopper 
Figure 2. Web Services Scenario Enhanced by Web Services Security 
 
MATCHING SECURITY STANDARDS TO BUSINESS NEEDS 
The implications of Web Services innovation for general adopters are significant (Xu , Selsikas and O’Keefe, 2003).  Web 
services can lead to e-service interactions within and across organizations.  In view of the unique environment and strategy of 
individual service providers, security considerations must be customized to meet business goals. There is a wide variety of 
security threats, including un-authenticated sender, un-authorized receiver, denial of service, dictionary attack, replay attack, 
token substitution, message modification, man-in-the-middle attack, domain name server attacks, Trojan horse, and so on.   
Managers should be aware that it is practically impossible to prepare for countering against each and every type of security 
threat.  A cost-effective strategy is to align security-enhancing solutions with business needs. The focus should be placed on 
reducing the exposure and spread of the risk.  To provide some guidance for the selection of XML standards in Web services 
applications, we match various XML security standards to business security goals in Table 2. 
Business managers should be aware of various technologies available to meet the security requirements as they plan for the 
launch of Web services.  Some standards such as XKMS address broader security goals while others such as SAML are more 
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XML Standards Security Goals 
WS-Security Authentication, Confidentiality 
SAML Authentication 
XML Digital Signature Authentication, Integrity, Non-repudiation, 
Audit, Trust 
XML Encryption Confidentiality, Integrity 
XKMS Confidentiality, Non-repudiation, Audit, 
Integrity,  Trust 
XACML Authorization 
XrML Authorization 
Table 2.  XML Security Standards and Their Goals 
DISCUSSION 
Security is a major concern of potential adopters of Web services.  Organizations using the traditional HTTPS or TLS/SSL 
should be aware that their security measures need to be updated to meet the needs of Web services.  Moreover, emerging 
standards for Web services security should be selected cautiously to match them to business security goals.  Due to the 
limitations of the individual Web services security standards, it is necessary to combine multiple standards in implementing 
Web services security.  For example, SAML assumes trust between trading partners, which must be supplemented by XML 
Signature and XML Encryption.  Also, XrML and XAML manage authorization but do not address authentication, which can 
be complemented with encryption and digital signature protocols.  Finally, Web services security must be integrated with the 
enterprise environments (Nakamur et al, 2002).  The recipients of SOAP messages with the accompanying security 
information should provide an environment where the messages can be processed and acted upon. 
 
We have focused on the implementation of Web service security in this paper. To achieve business success with Web 
services, an organization should also take into account a number of other factors as follows:  
• Financial considerations.  Web services will provide a new channel to develop new markets.  Gartner predicts that in 
2004, sales in the Web services market is expected to grow to $28 billion (Gartner, 2002).  However, Web services 
are geographically independent.  It is important that critical business data and proprietary processes are secured from 
unauthorized access.   A breach in corporate data integrity will have serious financial impact.  
• Legislative Compliance.  Government legislation increasingly requires that consumer data are not revealed without 
the permission of its owner.  Insurance companies, hospitals and organizations working with patient data need to 
ensure compliance with The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, known as HIPAA.  
HIPAA is expected to cost the healthcare industry at least $3.8 billion between 2003 and 2008 (Beaver and Herold, 
2003).  
• Privacy.  Using SOAP messages, data are increasingly being exposed as it moves over the insecure Internet.  Any 
breach of data privacy may result in the loss of trust from consumers and business partners. 
CONCLUSION 
While traditional security infrastructures can still be used to support Web services, they cannot address the special challenges 
posed by Web services of allowing multiple parties to access multi-step processes across disparate corporate firewalls using 
multiple devices. Developing and adopting XML-based web services security standards is therefore important to leverage the 
capabilities of web services.  Faced with a variety of emerging Web services security standards, a service provider should not 
choose security solutions randomly. The framework for matching the security standards to the business security goals, 
proposed in this paper, provided some guidance to assist service providers in strategically choosing security solutions. 
Web services are already being implemented and are becoming a normal part of daily electronic transactions.  Widespread 
implementation of web services and the generation of new revenue streams rely on ensuring that Web services security 
requirements are met satisfactorily.  Moreover, it is important to emphasize that security of any business application must be 
integrated into the overall security plan of the firm.  Standards for Web service security are still evolving. With the 
integration of web services security into enterprise security, we can expect to see the roll-out of novel Web services in the 
future. 
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